HAPI Protocol
  • Introducing HAPI
  • Overview
    • AML and Cryptocurrency
    • Tracking Within Blockchain and DLT
    • Hacking Incursions on DApps and Liquidity
  • HAPI WP
    • HAPI - Core of Decentralized Cybersecurity
    • Data Providers
    • HAPI SC
    • Dual Categorization Mechanism in HAPI’s SC
    • Risk Assessment
    • HAPI Oracles
    • Example of Attack on CEX and the Framework of HAPI Protocol
    • Key Actors
    • Machine Learning
    • System Governance and Ability to Shape Cybersecurity Space Together
    • Bibliography
  • HAPI Tokenomics
    • Token distribution
    • Token sale details
    • Unlock schedule
  • HAPI Roadmap
    • Roadmap
  • HAPI Ecosystem
    • Blockchains
    • DeFi Projects
  • HAPI Public
    • Public resources
    • HAPI in media
  • HAPI Team
    • Core Team
    • Dev Team
  • Legal
    • Token Risks
  • HAPI Reporter
    • Working with reporter page
    • Reporter staking
    • How to Become an Official HAPI Reporter
    • How to get whitelisted
  • Developers
    • Integration pathways
    • API Integration
    • Accessing Solana contract via Javascript
    • HAPI Integration on NEAR
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  1. HAPI WP

Example of Attack on CEX and the Framework of HAPI Protocol

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Last updated 3 years ago

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For the sake of imparting the clearest and the most visually understandable workflow of the protocol, it’s reasonable to sequentially order the theoretical process of adversarial attack on CEX and DEX.

1. CEX 1 detects fraudulent transactions - hack that speedily turns into outflow of funds to the unknown wallet. 2. СЕХ_1 reports the event into HAPI Protocol that writes into the HAPI SC WalletID_1 to which the funds have been transferred. 3. HAPI Protocol analyses (based on the given metrics) a transaction and categorizes it in: Approved address WalletID_1 on the HAPI SC; Rejected inquiry of WalletID_1 on the HAPI SC 4. If the address is on the HAPI SC - HAPI Protocol sends WalletID_1 to DATAprovider in order to track and trace the upcoming transactional dealings from the same wallet. 5. DATAprovider via Oracles relays to the HAPI Protocol all of the nascent wallets on which the transactions are being transferred from the source wallet WalletID_1 6. HAPI Protocol analyses (based on metrics) wallet addresses Approved address WalletID_1 on the HAPI SC; Rejected inquiry of WalletID_1 on the HAPI SC 7. HAPI Protocol sends CEX_2 and DEX identificators of wallets from HAPI SC An unlawful actor makes an attempt to send fraudulent funds on CEX 2. CEX 2 knowing the threat from the aforementioned wallet can expose it to the potential risk - blocks the transfer. Unlawful actor makes an attempt to connect the address to DEX, DEX declines this attempt and/or completely blocks the wallet from making a transaction within DEX. HAPI allows for CEX to promptly notify its users about fraudulence taking place via Write Public Interface. CEX receives data about fraudulent activity described above, with this data available CEX may not only deftly freeze the siphon of funds but also reactively respond and announce to the users to abstain from using the CEX functionality for the time being. In this quite simple yet convenient fashion, CEX garners not only additional “points” for trustworthiness but also safeguards its users against the potentially exacerbating exploit.